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"Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it,
must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can
conceive. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
An employer can no more refuse to hire a woman because she is
Muslim than because she is African-American. Religious discrimination,
like discrimination because of race, sex, or national origin, is prohibited in
the workplace.2 A major problem with religious discrimination, that is
largely nonexistent with other protected classes is deciding who belongs to
the protected class. In the religious discrimination context, this involves
determining what constitutes a "religion" or a "religious belief."
Employers know they cannot refuse to hire a prospective employee solely
because the person is Jewish or Roman Catholic. However, can an
employer refuse to hire a person because it thinks the individual's belief
that Halloween is the holiest day of the year is, well, frightening? The
answer is unclear, and depends largely upon the particular definition of
religion that is used.
In religious discrimination cases, a court must initially determine
whether the plaintiff has a "religion" that is protected by the applicable
anti-discrimination statute. Therefore, the definition of religion is
especially crucial in determining the rights of workers who hold
nontraditional religious beliefs, such as the belief in Halloween belief
described above. There is not one unitary definition of religion used by
courts in this country. In fact, the Supreme Court has never attempted to
articulate a precise definition of "religion. 4
1. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, ETHtcs AS A RELIGION 95 (1951).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
3. See Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt. Inc., No. 97-1294, 1998 WL 54615, at *1
(7th Cir. Feb. 6, 1998) (discussing the plaintiffs belief in the Wiccian religion, which
includes the belief that Halloween is a holy day).
4. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The Supreme
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This Comment explores the definition of religion as a necessary
component for deciding state and federal cases dealing with religious
discrimination in the workplace. The two major theses of this Comment
are: (1) that the word "religion," as used in employment discrimination
statutes, should be interpreted broadly to include moral and ethical beliefs
that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs, and
(2) that vegan5 beliefs can be protected as religious beliefs under this
definition.
Part II provides background on religious discrimination statutes. Part
III outlines the main definitions of religion in the law today. First, the
major Supreme Court cases attempting to define religion are discussed.
Next, several appellate court decisions interpreting the Supreme Court
standards and setting forth various tests for defining religious beliefs are
analyzed. Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC or the Commission) definition of religion is discussed.
Part IV focuses on a recent California appellate court case, Friedman
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group,6 as an example of how
courts deal with defining religious belief in nontraditional religious
discrimination cases. Friedman has been chosen for special consideration
for three primary reasons. First, it deals with the important and novel
question of whether vegan beliefs can be considered "religious" under an
employment discrimination statute. In addition, the opinion is superbly
well-drafted, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the past and current
law with respect to definitions of and tests for religion. Finally, while the
case holds that veganism is not a religious belief protected under
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act,7 it lends support to the
argument that veganism, in certain circumstances, should be considered a
religious belief under federal law. This part also criticizes both the
Friedman court's chosen analysis for how to define religion in an
employment discrimination context and the court's ultimate conclusion in
the case.
Court has never announced a comprehensive definition of religion ...."); John C. Knechtle,
If We Don't Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It's Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521,
521 (2003) ("[Tlhe United States Supreme Court has tried to avoid the difficult task of
defining religion."). The Court has furnished various meanings for what constitutes
religion, but it has never attempted to distill the concept into a concrete definition or test
applicable in all instances. The major Supreme Court cases that analyze the meaning of
"religion" and "religious beliefs" are discussed at length later in this Comment. See infra
Part III.A.
5. A "vegan" is "a strict vegetarian who consumes no animal food or dairy products"
and "who abstains from using animal products." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at
http://www.m-w.com.
6. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), petition for review denied, 2002 Cal.
LEXIS 8131 (Cal. Nov. 26, 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1033 (2003).
7. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12900 (West 2004).
2005]
366 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:2
As a final point, Part V offers recommendations for defining what
constitutes a "religion" under religious discrimination laws. This section
recommends that the most prominent test used by courts today to define
religion should not be used for purposes, of defining religion vis-A-vis
employment discrimination statutes. Instead, courts should use the broad
definition of religion promulgated by the EEOC. This part also argues that
certain vegetarian and vegan beliefs should be protected as religious beliefs
under state and federal religious discrimination statutes.
II. BACKGROUND ON RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
religious freedom. The federal government, as well as the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, "shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ',
While the Constitution protects individuals from governmental intrusion
into religion, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII) protects
employees from religious discrimination in the employment context.10 In
addition, most states have statutes similar to Title VII that also prohibit
religious discrimination in the workplace." Title VII and state employment
discrimination statutes will be discussed in turn.
A. Title VII
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against an employee or prospective employee on the basis
of religion. Specifically,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... 12
Under Title VII, an employer must "reasonably accommodate ... an
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000).
10. JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: NEW CHALLENGES IN THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT 355 (1997).
11. VERN E. HAUCK, ARBITRATING RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION GRIEVANCES 12 (1997).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice"
unless the employer can demonstrate that it is unable to do so because of
"undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."' 3
There are two main ways that an employer can discriminate against an
individual because of the individual's religion. 4 The first way is called
"disparate treatment" discrimination, which occurs when an employer
literally discriminates against a prospective or current employee because of
the person's religious beliefs, observances, or practices. 5 An example of
disparate treatment discrimination is when an employer refuses to hire a
prospective employee, or takes adverse action against a current employee,
because of the employee's religious adherence or nonadherence. 6  The
second major way an employer may religiously discriminate against an
employee under Title VII is by refusing to accommodate the employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice. 7 However, if the
accommodation would cause the employer undue hardship, it is not
required.' s An example of an unlawful employment practice for failure to
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
14. Title VII proscribes two different types of religious discrimination-
discrimination on the basis of a religious observance or practice and
discrimination on the basis of pure belief. These two types of discrimination are
analyzed differently. When an employee shows that her employer took an
adverse employment action against her on the basis of a religious observance or
practice, the employer can avoid liability by showing either that it reasonably
accommodated the employee's observance or practice, or that accommodation of
the observance or practice would result in an undue hardship for the employer.
However, when an employee shows that her employer took an adverse action
against her on the basis of her religious beliefs, and not because of an
observance or practice, the employer is liable.
Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 2002)
(citations omitted).
15. Wayne N. Outten et al., ACLU, The Rights of Employees and Union Members
225-26 (2d ed. 1994).
16. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Blue Springs, 289 F.3d 546, 549-51 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a youth crisis counselor stated a claim for religious discrimination when, after
disclosing to her supervisor that "she observed tenets of Native American spirituality," she
was, inter alia, passed over for promotion, denied extra compensation she had been
promised, treated poorly, and told to find a "good Christian boyfriend to teach her to be
submissive"); Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1122, 1127 (D.N.J.
1990) (holding that an otherwise qualified Jewish employee who was denied a promotion
established a prima facie case of discrimination when his supervisor told another employee
that "'[als long as I'm the warehouse manager, no Jew will run the warehouse for me"').
17. See HAUCK, supra note 11, at 113-14 ("EEOC Guidelines recommend that
employers make reasonable accommodation by considering changes in work schedules,
changes in job assignment, or by following some system of voluntary worker exchange,
flexible scheduling, or lateral transfer. Whenever cost is de minimis and the effect on
seniority slight, the employer must make reasonable accommodation for religious
preference and practice.").
18. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2000); id. at 116-19. For the Supreme Court's analysis of
20051
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accommodate an employee's religious observance is when an employer
refuses to accommodate an employee by giving the employee a certain day
of the week off for religious observance.' 9
Comparatively few of Title VII's employment discrimination claims
are based on religion.2° Yet, when claims are brought on religious
discrimination grounds, most of the litigation is centered on the issues of
what is a "reasonable accommodation" and what constitutes "undue
hardship.",
21
What constitutes religious belief, observance, or practice is not heavily
litigated because in most instances, the religious nature of the claim is
obvious22 (e.g., a Seventh Day Adventist is fired for refusing to work on
Saturdays, or a White Supremist 23 refuses to hire an otherwise qualified
accommodation and undue hardship in Title VII cases, see generally Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that an employer does not need to incur
more than minimal costs in order to accommodate an employee's religious practices). For a
critique of the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 7010) of Title VII, see Debbie N.
Kaminer, Title VII's Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious
Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 585-96
(2000) (arguing that Congress intended Title VII to guarantee a higher level of
accommodation than the courts require of employers today).
19. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989). In Hacienda, a
Seventh Day Adventist was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays. Id. at 1507. Before
termination, she reminded her employer that she needed Saturdays off in order to observe
her Sabbath. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the employer
failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs religious practice, finding especially
important the fact that the employer "did nothing to solve the problem." Id. at 1513.
. 20. See MICHAEL D. LEVIN-EPSTEIN, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PRIMER OF EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 39 (3d ed. 1984) ("Religious discrimination is a far less
frequent topic of litigation than race, sex, age, or national origin discrimination.").
According to the EEOC's website, in the fiscal year 2002, the Commission received
2572 charges of religious discrimination, compared with 29,910 charges of race-based
discrimination, 25,536 charges of sex-based discrimination, and 9046 charges of national
origin discrimination. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Religious
Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/types/religion.html (last modified Dec. 10, 2004);
Race/Color Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last modified Dec. 10,
2004); Sex-Based Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sex.html (last modified
Dec. 10, 2004); National Origin Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/origin/index.html
(last modified Dec. 10, 2004).
21. LEVIN-EPSTEiN, supra note 20, at 39. ("When religious discrimination cases arise,
they usually center on two related issues-(1) did the employer make 'reasonable
accommodation' to the religious needs of employees and (2) was the employer excused
from accommodating its employees on the grounds of 'undue hardship?').
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2004) ("In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is
religious is not at issue.").
23. Notably, White Supremist beliefs have been deemed "religious" under Title VII.
See generally Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023-24
(E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff's belief in Creativity, which "teaches that
followers should live their lives according to what will best foster the advancement of white
people and the denigration of all others," functions as a religion in the plaintiffs life and is
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Jewish manager). However, an employer does not need to accommodate a
person whose beliefs, observances, or practices are nonreligious in nature
(e.g., a devout Republican who wants Election Day off to campaign).
Therefore, the preliminary question of whether the individual is being
discriminated against "because of' religion must always be answered.24 In
the case of an individual who has nontraditional religious beliefs or
practices, it is especially important for the courts to first determine whether
the person's beliefs constitute a "religion" protected by Title VII.25 If the
question is answered in the affirmative, the disparate treatment or
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue burden" analyses will begin.
However, if the court finds the individual does not have a protected
religion, the case will be dismissed. Therefore, the definition of religion is
especially crucial in determining the rights of workers who have
nontraditional religious beliefs, practices, or observances.
In 1972, Congress enacted section 7010) of Title VII, which defines
religion to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief., 26 This broad definition is fundamentally flawed because it uses
the word "religious" to define "religion. 27 Because Title VII's definition
of "religion" is deficient, the EEOC, charged with administering Title VII,
has formulated its own definition of religion.28
B. State Religious Discrimination Statutes
Title VII extends only to employers with fifteen or more employees,29
but, for the most part, this does not mean that employees in small
businesses are left unprotected. Most states and many local governments
have fair employment practices (FEP) statutes that cover employers with
therefore a protected religion under Title VII). Peterson is discussed at length infra Part
III.D.
24. Tiano v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that in
order to make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that
"(1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an
employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the
employer threatened her or subjected her to discriminatory treatment ... because of her
inability to fulfill the job requirements.") (emphasis added).
25. See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1977) ("[I]t must be
determined ab initio whether plaintiff's beliefs qualify for protection as a religion.").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
27. Title VII's substandard definition of "religion" has not gone unnoticed by the
courts. See Brown, 441 F. Supp. at 1384 (referring to the statutory definition as
"unenlightening"); see also Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal,
23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 309, 377 (1994) ("Congress's definition was circular and question-
begging in Title VII .... ") (footnote omitted).
28. See discussion infra Part III.D.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
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fewer than fifteen employees. The number of employees required for an
employer to fall within a given state's FEP law ranges from one to fifteen.3"
Even before Title VII was enacted, states began enacting FEP laws.3
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, half the states had already enacted
laws in this area.32 State FEP laws are often modeled after the federal
legislation, but their coverage and substantive provisions vary greatly.33
While Title VII is limited to discrimination because of sex, religion,
national origin, color, or race, many state FEP laws provide protection on a
much broader scale. For example, state and local FEP statutes may provide
coverage for employees who are discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation.34
III. DEFINING RELIGION
The United States is the world's most religiously diverse country.35
Therefore, it is not surprising that the problem of defining religion in this
diverse country is not limited to the realm of employment discrimination
claims. Professor Steven Gey notes that "[t]he problems associated with
defining religion for First Amendment purposes have multiplied in modem
times due to the increasingly diverse ethnic and religious character of the
population and the equally diverse nature of religious beliefs. 36 Noting a
problem that is central to the focus of this Comment, he continues: "To
complicate matters further, the lines between ethical and religious doctrines
have become very indistinct.,
37
30. Robert Lukens, Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassment and Individual Liability,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 359 n.417 (1996).
31. For example, in 1945 New York enacted the first FEP law in the country. LEVIN-
EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 8.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8-9.
34. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2004) ("It shall be an unlawful
employment practice... [flor an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital
status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the
person ... or to discriminate against the person .... ") (emphasis added).
Other categories that are protected in certain jurisdictions include "height, weight,
personal appearance, family responsibilities, political affiliation, arrest or even convictions
records, unrelated to job duties." Peter M. Panken et al., Litigating Claims of
Discrimination in Employee Benefits, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LITIGATION 2003, at 437, 450
(A.L.I.-A.B.A., Course of Study Materials, vol. 2, 2003).
35. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 522 ("Today the religious landscape in the United States
is the most diverse of any country in the world."); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 174 (1965) (referring to "the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country" and
noting that "[o]ver 250 sects inhabit our land").
36. STEVEN G. GET, RELIGION AND THE STATE 97 (2001).
37. Id.
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The definition of "religion" used in employment discrimination cases
is crucial because, as noted supra, it determines who is protected and who
is not. Therefore, defining religion "is more often than not a difficult and
delicate task."38 There is currently no consensus on how to define religion
in this context. Accordingly, this section will explore the various
definitions of religion promulgated by the Supreme Court, the federal
courts, and the EEOC.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Defining Religion
1. Early Cases
The Framers of the Constitution defined religion according to belief in
a "Supreme Being" or "Creator." James Madison, for example, called
religion "the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of
discharging it."39 Similarly, in his Letter to the Danbury Baptists, Thomas
Jefferson once described religion as "a matter which lies solely between
Man & his God."'4°
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court
adopted this theistic,4 or substantive, definition of religion. In Davis v.
Beason, the Court announced that "[t]he term 'religion' has reference to
one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will."42 The theistic characterization continued well into the twentieth
century. In 193 1, Chief Justice Hughes stated in a dissenting opinion that
"[t]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.... One cannot speak of
religious liberty.., without assuming the existence of a belief in supreme
allegiance to the will of God.4 3
38. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
39. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in GEY, supra note 36, at 4.
40. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in GEY,
supra note 36, at 30.
41. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL Law § 14-6, at 1179 (2d ed.
1988) ("At least through the nineteenth century, courts defined 'religion' narrowly, in terms
of theistic notions respecting divinity, morality, and worship. In order to be considered
legitimate, religions had to be viewed as 'civilized' by Western Standards.").
42. 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
43. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting).
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2. Modem Supreme Court Cases
a. Torcaso v. Watkins
In the middle of the twentieth century, America's growing religiously
diverse populous led to the demise of the theistic conception of religion. It
simply could no longer be ignored that many recognized religions, such as
Buddhism,44 were not based on a belief in a Supreme Being. In fact,
Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins,45
recognized this exact contention. In Torcaso, a unanimous Court struck
down a Maryland test for public office that required inductees to declare
belief in the existence of God.46
The reasoning of the Court sheds light on a new formulation of
"religion":
[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion."
Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.47
Professor John Knechtle explains that "[t]his ruling targeted the fact that
the government could not aid a religion based upon the fact that they
believed in a 'God' as opposed to other religions that did not.'"48 Critical to
the Court's evolution in defining religion is footnote 11, which explains
what is meant by "those religions founded on different beliefs": "Among
religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism4 9 and others. 5 °
44. See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188-93 (1965) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) for a discussion of Buddhism, including whether or not Buddhists believe in a
"Supreme Being" and a short history of Buddhism in this country.
45. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
46. Id. at 496 ("This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades
the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against
him.").
47. Id. at 495 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
48. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 525.
49. Notwithstanding the Court's reference to Secular Humanism as a religion, some
lower courts have been reluctant to extend the definition of religion to humanists in all
circumstances. For a discussion of footnote 11 and Secular Humanism as a religion, see
GEY, supra note 36, at 104.
50. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.
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b. United States v. Seeger
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to redefine religion in the context of the exemption of conscientious
objectors from combatant training and service in the armed forces. In
United States v. Seeger,51 the Court formulated a new test for defining
religion that broadly opened the door for many new sets of beliefs to be
deemed "religious."
In Seeger, the Court had to interpret section 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act. 2 The Act "exempts from combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons
who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form., 53  At issue was the
constitutionality of section 6(j), which defined the term "religious training
and belief' as "'an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not
including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.' '' 54  In short, the Court had to interpret
Congress's intention in using the words "in a relation to a Supreme
Being."55 Congress put the Court in a precarious position because the
statute could easily be read as unconstitutionally discriminating against
different forms of religious belief.
The Court was quick to find that Congress did not intend "Supreme
Being" to be interpreted narrowly as the orthodox, or traditional, God.56
The Court concluded that "Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme
Being' rather than the designation 'God,' was merely clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and
to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. 57 In
imputing to Congress a broad interpretation of "Supreme Being," the Court
formulated a test 58 for whether a person's religious beliefs fell under
section 6(j): "[T]he test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is
51. 380U.S. 163 (1965).
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 165 (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1958)) (alteration in original).
55. Id. at 174 ("Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: Does the term 'Supreme
Being' as used in § 6(j) mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being,
or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent?')
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed.)).
56. Id. at 178.
57. Id. at 165. It is interesting to note that the Court leaves out "or a merely personal
moral code" here. The Court discusses the meaning of a personal moral code later in its
opinion. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
58. The Seeger Court's test has come to be known as "the parallel belief test."
Feofanov, supra note 27, at 368.
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whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."59 The Court based its test,
in part, on "the ever-broadening understanding of the modem religious
community.,
60
According to the Court, the parallel belief test "is simple of
application" and is "essentially an objective one."'6' The Court advised that
"[i]n such an intensely personal area.., the claim of the registrant that his
belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight....
The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. 62 Courts, therefore,
are not permitted to question the truth of the beliefs, only whether they are
sincerely held: "Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of
things, religious. 63
Along with essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
the statutory definition of "religious training and belief' excludes
registrants whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code."
64
The meaning of a "merely personal moral code" in the statute is uncertain.
Once again, the Court interpreted Congress's intention:
The use by Congress of the words "merely personal" seems to us
to restrict the exception to a moral code which is not only
personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and
is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore,
that if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective
registrants... meet the test that we lay down then their
objections cannot be based on a "merely personal" moral code.65
The Court, in limiting the moral code exception to a personal moral code
59. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
60. Id. at 180. As framed by Dmitry Feofanov, "[i]n creating this standard, the Court
was influenced by modem liberal theological thought ..." Feofanov, supra note 27, at
368. The Court looked to the writings of Dr. Paul Tillich, a Protestant theologian. Tillich
views God as not "'out there' or beyond the skies but as the ground of our very being."
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180. Tillich equates God with "depth": "[T]he depths of your life, the
source of your being, of your ultimate concern" in life. Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TILLICH,
THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948). For a critique of Tillich's writings and,
therefore, the Court's reliance on them, see Feofanov, supra note 27, at 370 ("Tillich...
through verbal acrobatics attempted to erase the difference between religious belief and non-
belief.").
61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 185.
64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (2000).
65. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
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that is the sole basis for the registrant's belief, continued to formulate a
broad definition of religion.
Analyzing Seeger's beliefs shows how broad the Court's definition
stretches. In Seeger's own words, his beliefs seem to be primarily
philosophical or ethical. On his Selective Service form, Seeger declared
his was a "'belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own
sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." 66 The Court noted
that "he cited... Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical
belief in intellectual and moral integrity 'without belief in God, except in
the remotest sense.' ' ' 67 Nonetheless, the Court found that Seeger's beliefs
satisfied the religion test, and that he qualified for an exemption from
combatant duty.68
c. Welsh v. United States
Five years later, in Welsh v. United States,69 the Court confronted
another conscientious objector case and used the opportunity to expand the
definition of religion even further, denoting the high water mark for a
liberal definition of religion. Unlike Seeger, who claimed his beliefs were
"religious," Welsh struck the word "religious" from his application.70
While Seeger and Welsh differed in this respect, the Court found many
similarities between the two men. Both men declared on their applications
that they "held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars
where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was
wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take
part in such an evil practice. ' 7' Also, the Court never doubted that Welsh,
like Seeger, was sincere in his beliefs.72
Despite their similarities, the fact remains that Welsh did not claim to
be "religious." According to Welsh, his views were formed from readings
in history and sociology.73 While in actuality broadening its scope, the
Court explained what was required under the Seeger test:
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious
objection to all war to be "religious" within the meaning of § 6(j)
is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral,
ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and
66. Id. at 166.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 187-88.
69. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
70. Id. at 341.
71. Id. at 337.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 341.
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that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions.74
As for section 6(j)'s exclusion of objectors with "essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code,
' 75
the Court stated that this language only served to exclude those objectors
whose beliefs were not deeply held, or whose beliefs were not based at all
on moral, ethical, or religious principles, but instead were based "solely
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. ''76  Since
Welsh's beliefs rested on deeply held ethical principles, he was "clearly"
permitted a conscientious objector exemption.77
It is an understatement to say that all members of the Welsh Court
were comfortable with the plurality' sU new Seeger/Welsh standard. In his
concurrence, Justice Harlan vehemently argued that the plurality's new
standard went against the explicit language of the statute, as well as the
explicit intention of Congress to exempt "religious" conscientious
objectors.79 The new standard exempted conscientious objectors who did
not hold "religious" beliefs. According to Justice Harlan, the Court could
not get around the constitutional issue raised by section 60)80 by distorting
the meaning of the statute in an effort to include all conscientious
objectors.81 Harlan's concurrence squarely addressed this constitutional
question and quickly concluded that the distinction between religious and
nonreligious conscientious beliefs was patently unconstitutional8 2 Justice
Harlan believed that "[i]f the exemption is to be given application, it must
encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those whose
beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The
common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which
74. Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added).
75. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (2000).
76. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-43.
77. Id. at 343.
78. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the plurality
opinion in which Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, and Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 335.
Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case, and Justice
Harlan concurred in the result. Id. at 344. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Stewart, dissented. Id. at 367.
79. Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The prevailing opinion today... has performed
a lobotomy and completely transformed the statute by reading out of it any distinction
between religiously acquired beliefs and those deriving from 'essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."').
80. That is, whether Congress had violated the Establishment Clause by exempting
religious conscientious objectors but not nonreligious conscientious objectors, therefore
favoring religion over non-religion.
81. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I cannot subscribe to a wholly
emasculated construction of a statute to avoid facing a latent constitutional question ... .
82. Id. at 356-60.
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a belief is held."83 Justice Harlan concurred in Welsh because he did not
want the exemption to be struck entirely. He recognized the importance of
the deeply rooted policy of exempting conscientious objectors, and so he
decided to "accept the prevailing opinion's conscientious objector test, not
as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but as patchwork of judicial
making that cures the defect of underinclusion in § 6(j)."
Justice Harlan's concurrence is examined here because it is important
to the Welsh opinion as a whole, and because it explains the criticism the
Court has encountered with respect to the Seeger/Welsh standard. While
the Seeger/Welsh standard has been criticized (and rightly so) for usurping
a congressional statute in an attempt to evade an important constitutional
issue, it is important to realize that the test has applications outside the
conscientious objector realm.
The statutory interpretation and First Amendment infirmities with
section 6(j) largely disappear when the standard is used to define religion in
other contexts, including in employment discrimination cases. If the
Seeger/Welsh standard is disassociated from the conscientious objector
framework and thought of simply as the Supreme Court's definition of
"religion," then the test can be used whenever courts and local employment
boards need guidance in determining whether a person's beliefs are
"religious." Although the Seeger/Welsh standard has been criticized for
what it was designed to accomplish, that does not mean that the standard is
without significant value in other areas, including employment
discrimination laws. This is especially true because Congress defined the
word "religion" in Title VII by referring to "religious observance and
practice, as well as belief,"85 "religious" needs to be defined.
d. Wisconsin v. Yoder
Two years after Welsh, the Supreme Court-though only in dictum-
seemed to retreat from the broad definitional standard for religion that it
had so recently developed. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 6 the Court held that
Wisconsin's compulsory education laws violated the Amish's free exercise
of religious beliefs.87 To come to this conclusion, the Court first had to
determine that the Amish's reasons for not wanting to send their children to
public school beyond the eighth grade were rooted in religion, and not
purely secular or personal preferences.88 The Court gave an example of the
83. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 366-67.
85. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (2000).
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id. at 215.
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distinction: "[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious
basis. ' 89  The Court concluded (in seemingly direct contrast to
Seeger/Welsh): "Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather
than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses." 90  However, this exactly contradicts the Court's language in
Welsh.9' In Welsh, the only way a person's beliefs would be excluded from
the test was if they were either (1) not deeply held or (2) based "solely
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. ' '92 Thoreau's
beliefs do not fit into either of these categories, and therefore would have
been found to be "religious" under Seeger/Welsh. Interestingly, there is no
mention of or citation to either the Seeger or Welsh definition of religion in
the majority opinion. 93
The majority's possible definitional retreat did not escape the attention
of Justice Douglas in his Yoder dissent. Justice Douglas, criticizing the
majority, argued: "[Tlhe Court retreats when in reference to Henry Thoreau
it says his 'choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and
such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.' That is
contrary to what we held in United States v. Seeger... ,94 Douglas went
on to quote the Seeger test, and he also quoted the words Welsh used to
describe his beliefs-"the essence of Welsh's philosophy"-which had
89. Id. at 216.
90. Id.
91. See Feofanov, supra note 27, at 374 ("In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court noted in
dictum that philosophical and personal beliefs, as opposed to religious beliefs, are not to be
protected by the First Amendment. In the Court's view, the philosophy of Thoreau, as
opposed to the religion of the Amish, would not be protected, even though the standards of
Seeger and Welsh seem to demand at least this much.") (footnotes omitted).
92. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970).
93. It is the author's opinion that the Thoreau analogy is an example of how the Court
was doing its best to limit Yoder's holding. The Court did not want other groups to be able
to evade compulsory education laws. Therefore, it served the Court's purpose in Yoder to
narrow the definition of religion. The Court went into great detail describing the history,
culture, and faith of the Amish. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-17. The Court noted that few
recognized religions in the United States today could match the Amish's "300 years of
consistent practice" and their "sustained faith pervading and regulating [their] entire mode
of life." Id. at 219. Yoder as a whole has been highly criticized by academics. For
example, Professor Marci Hamilton, arguing Yoder was wrongly decided, referred to the
case as "a love letter to the Amish." Professor Marci Hamilton, Guest Lecturer in Professor
Sarah Gordon's Church & State class at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Nov.
2003). For the foregoing reasons, this Comment does not give any possible Supreme Court
reformulation of the definition of religion in Yoder any substantial weight.
94. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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qualified as a religion.95 He concluded, "I adhere to these exalted views of
'religion' and see no acceptable alternative to them now that we have
become a Nation of many religions and sects, representing all the
diversities of the human race. '
B. Lower Court Approaches
1. Judge Adams's Concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi
After Torcaso, Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder, the lower courts were
understandably in a state of confusion over how to define religion, or
religious beliefs. In a comprehensive concurring opinion in Malnak v.
Yogi,97 Judge Arlin Adams of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals canvassed
the state of the law with respect to the modern definition of religion. Judge
Adams wrote separately to explain what he thought was a "newer, more
expansive reading of 'religion"' that had been developed in the 1960s and
1970s, which formed the basis of the majority's result in the case.98 After
discussing Seeger and Welsh, Judge Adams concluded that the broad
definition of religion developed in the conscientious objector context was
most likely applicable to constitutional inquiries.99 Judge Adams described
the modern definition of religion as "not confined to the relationship of
man with his Creator."' ° He noted that while the old definition had been
renounced, the new definition was not fully developed.'' The definition
was by analogy: "Presumably beliefs holding the same important position
for members of one of the new religions as the traditional faith holds for
more orthodox believers are entitled to the same treatment as the traditional
beliefs."' 2 The problem with the analogy, however, was that the Supreme
Court had not issued any objective guidelines in comparing the new with
the old. Judge Adams, in response, proposed "three useful indicia that are
basic to our traditional religions and that are themselves related to the
values that undergird the first amendment" to be used in making the
95. Id. at 248-49.
96. Id. at 249.
97. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). Malnak held that the teaching of an elective course
called the Science of Creative Intelligence-Transcendental Meditation in a New Jersey
public high school was a religious activity and constituted an establishment of religion in
violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 198.
98. Id. at 200 (Adams, J., concurring).
99. See id. at 204 ("[I]f the Court is willing to read 'religious belief' so as to
comprehend beliefs based upon pantheistic and ethical views, it might be presumed to favor
a similar inclusive definition of 'religion' as that term appears in the first amendment.").
100. Id. at 207.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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analogy.'0 3 Judge Adams's three indicia for determining whether a given
set of beliefs is "religious" were (1) the nature of the ideas in question, (2)
comprehensiveness, and (3) formal signs.' ° The meaning and importance
of each indicium will be examined in turn.
When a court examines the nature of the ideas in question, it is to
examine the content of the asserted religion, not for its truth, but for the
"'ultimate' nature of the ideas presented."'0 5 Judge Adams explained the
nature and the importance of "ultimate" ideas as follows:
One's views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more
imponderable questions-the meaning of life and death, man's
role in the Universe, the proper moral code of right and wrong-
are those likely to be the most "intensely personal" and important
to the believer. They are his ultimate concerns. As such, they are
to be carefully guarded from governmental interference ....
According to Adams, the "ultimate" nature of the ideas in question is the
most crucial and convincing evidence that they should be regarded as
religious.107
Not every belief that deals with an "ultimate" idea will be deemed
religious, however, due to the second indicium: comprehensiveness.
Comprehensiveness is an important element because "[a] religion is not
generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it has a broader
scope. It lays claim to an ultimate and comprehensive 'truth.""' 0 8 Hence,
while the "Big Bang" theory is an interpretation of the creation of the
Universe-an answer to an "ultimate" question-it is not, without more, a
"'religious' idea."' 9  "Likewise, moral or patriotic views are not by
themselves 'religious,' but if they are pressed as divine law or a part of a
comprehensive belief-system that presents them as 'truth,' they might well
rise to the religious level."
' 10
The third indicium for analyzing a set of ideas-"any formal, external,
or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions"' 1-is
probably the most objective and easiest to apply. Examples of these formal
signs include "formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of
clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of
103. Id. at 207-08.
104. Id. at 208-209.
105. Id. at 208.
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional
religions."'
1 2
Judge Adams's three indicia for defining religious beliefs by analogy
was subsequently adopted by the Third Circuit two years after Malnak, in
Africa v. Pennsylvania,"3 an opinion written by Adams. The influence of
Judge Adams's test spread well beyond the Third Circuit: the test has been
adopted by several circuit courts of appeals, and has been used in opinions
from various district and state courts."
14
In Malnak, Judge Adams warned against rigid application of the
indicia: "Although these indicia will be helpful, they should not be thought
of as a final 'test' for religion. Defining religion is a sensitive and
112. Id.
113. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). In Africa, the court applied the three indicia to hold
that the MOVE organization, as described by the petitioner, an inmate in a Pennsylvania
state prison, was not a religion. The appellant, Frank Africa, alleged he was a 'Naturalist
Minister' for the MOVE organization, which he testified was a religious organization, and
that he was required by his religion to eat a diet consisting entirely of raw foods. Id. at
1026. The court emphasized that its holding in the case was limited to the description of
MOVE made available to the district court by Africa, and that MOVE was not forever
barred from being classified as a religious organization. Id. at 1036 n.22. Unfortunately for
Africa, he acted pro se at the district court trial. Id. at 1026.
While the court held that because MOVE was not a religion the prison was not
constitutionally required to provide Africa with his raw food diet, Judge Adams sent a stern
message to the prison officials:
We do not mean to suggest, however, that the requirements of the first
amendment also define the proper scope of prudent state penological policy.
Especially in light of the apparent willingness of Graterford officials to accede
to the dietary requirements of other prisoners, both for religious and for medical
reasons, it is not clear from the record why special accommodations cannot be
made in this instance for a prisoner who obviously cares deeply about what food
he eats.
Id. at 1037. While Africa lost his legal battle, he ultimately won the war with the prison
officials. According to Judge Adams's answer to a law student's query at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Graterford eventually did provide Africa with his raw food diet.
Judge Arlin Adams, Guest Lecturer in Professor Sarah Gordon's Church & State class at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 18, 2003).
For an interesting and detailed description of the MOVE organization, see the
Religious Movements Homepage Project at the University of Virginia at
http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/Move.html (last modified July 20, 2001).
114. See Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 677 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) ("Judge Adams's concurring opinion was later adopted by the Third, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals."); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional
"Religion": A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of First Amendment Definitions of
Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 143-44 (discussing cases applying the Adams test);
cf Feofanov, supra note 27, at 376 ("The Adams test gained international acceptance in
1983 when the Australian equivalent of the Supreme Court, relying on Malnak v. Yogi,
came up with a two-fold definition of religion in a tax context .. "). Adams's three-part
test was relied on by the court in Friedman. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
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important legal duty. Flexibility and careful consideration of each belief
system are needed."' 5 Despite Adams's warning, rigid application of the
indicia seems to have become the norm. Judge Adams may not have
intended to invent a "test" for defining religion, but that is what was
produced."6  The use of Judge Adams's indicia for defining religious
practices or beliefs in employment discrimination cases is criticized
infra.
117
2. United States v. Meyers
In United States v. Meyers,"8 the Tenth Circuit developed an approach
for defining religion similar to Judge Adams's three-indicia approach." 9
After a jury trial, David Meyers was found guilty of federal crimes
prohibiting the possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 20 Before the
trial, Meyers filed motions to dismiss based on religious freedom under the
First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 12' He
testified that "he is the founder and Reverend of the Church of Marijuana
and that it is his sincere belief that his religion commands him to use,
possess, grow and distribute marijuana for the good of mankind and the
planet earth."'
122
In reviewing the district court's denial of Meyers's religious freedom
defense, the Tenth Circuit adopted a list of factors to determine if Meyers's
beliefs concerning marijuana qualified as a religion. 23  The court
considered the following factors: (1) ultimate ideas, (2) metaphysical
beliefs, (3) moral or ethical system, (4) comprehensiveness, and (5)
accoutrements of religion. 24 The "accoutrements of religion" factor is
similar to Judge Adams's formal or external signs indicium, and includes
(a) founder, prophet, or teacher, (b) important writings, (c) gathering
places, (d) keepers of knowledge, (e) ceremonies and rituals, (f) structure
115. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210 (Adams, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
116. For example, Judge Adams's own opinion in Africa has been criticized for too
rigidly applying the test. E.g., T. Mark Mosely, Comment, Intelligent Design: A Unique
Perspective to the Origins Debate, 15 REGENT U. L. REv. 327, 346 n. 128 (2003) ("Although
the court pointed out [in Africa] that the indicia were not to be seen as a rigid, all-
encompassing 'test,' it did, in effect, apply the definition as a test.") (citations omitted).
117. See infra Part V.A.
118. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
119. The Meyers test, though it is similar to Judge Adams's three-part test, is discussed
here because the defendant in Friedman argued for its use in determining whether
Friedman's beliefs constituted a religion under California law. See infra Part IV.D.
120. Id. at 1479.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1482-84.
124. Id. at 1483.
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or organization, (g) holidays, (h) diet or fasting, (i) appearance and
clothing, and (j) propagation.125
These factors, like Judge Adams's indicia, are not to be applied
rigidly. No one factor is dispositive: "[T]he factors should be seen as
criteria that, if minimally satisfied, counsel the inclusion of beliefs within
the term 'religion. ' ', 2 6 However, in a nod to Yoder, the court cautioned
that "[p]urely personal, political, ideological, or secular beliefs probably
would not satisfy enough criteria for inclusion. '127 The Tenth Circuit held
that "Meyers' beliefs more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or way of
life rather than a 'religion.'
' 128
C. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Definition of
Religion
As discussed supra, Title VII defines religion to include "all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.' '129  As this
definition is at best vague and circular, the EEOC codified its own
definition of religion. 3° The EEOC's broad definition relied upon the
standard developed in Seeger and Welsh.13 ' The EEOC regulation defines
religious practices and observances to "include moral or ethical beliefs as
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views.' 32  Furthermore, "[t]he fact that no religious
group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the
individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not
determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or
prospective employee."'
13
Thus, the EEOC advises broad religious protection under Title VII.'3
The definition is not limited to traditional or theistic beliefs, but includes
sincerely held moral and ethical beliefs. Importantly, a belief may be
125. Id. at 1483-84.
126. Id. at 1484 (quoting United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1503 (D. Wyo.
1995)).
127. Id. (quoting Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at 1504) (alteration in original).
128. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2004).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. As an example of the breadth of coverage, some courts have held the belief in
atheism to be protected under the statute. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that an atheistic employee made out a
prima facie case of religious discrimination when she was constructively discharged for
failure to attend staff meetings that began with a short religious talk and prayer led by a
local minister).
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"religious" even if held by only a single person. Equally important is the
fact that a person's beliefs may be religious even when that person is part
of a religious group that does not share the beliefs at issue.
3 5
Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc. ,136 is a good example of
how a federal district court applied the Seeger/Welsh/EEOC guidelines
definition of "religion" in a nontraditional religious discrimination case. In
Peterson, Christopher Lee Peterson was a "follower of the World Church
of the Creator, an organization that preaches a system of beliefs called
Creativity, 137 the central tenet of which is white supremacy.' ' 3' The court
observed that "Creativity considers itself to be a religion, but it does not
espouse a belief in a God, afterlife or any sort of supreme being."'
139
Creativity "teaches that Creators should live their lives according to the
principle that what is good for white people is the ultimate good and what
is bad for white people is the ultimate sin. ' '14°
Peterson was a supervisor of eight employees at Wilmur
Communications, three of whom were not white.1 4 1 The day after a local
newspaper ran a story about the World Church of the Creator in which
Peterson was interviewed about the Church and his beliefs, he was
suspended and ultimately demoted to a non-supervisory position.
142
Everyone in the office knew about the article, and according to his
employer, the company no longer had confidence in his ability to be an
objective supervisor. 43  Peterson brought suit against his employer for
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.144
The Peterson court followed the Seeger/Welsh/EEOC definition of
religion to determine if Peterson's belief in the World Church of the
Creator constituted a religion for Title VII purposes. 145 The court found
that Peterson's beliefs were "sincerely held" and "religious in his own
135. This situation may occur, for example, when a person feels religiously compelled to
wear a cross, even though her religion does not require the wearing of a cross.
136. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
137. Creativity teaches, inter alia, that
all people of color are "savage" and intent on "mongreliz[ing] the White Race,"
that African-Americans are subhuman and should be "ship[ped] back to Africa";
that Jews control the nation and have instigated all wars in this century and
should be driven from power, and that the Holocaust never occurred, but if it
had occurred, Nazi Germany "would have done the world a tremendous favor."
Id. at 1015 (alterations in original).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1015-16.
140. Id. at 1016.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1016-17.
145. Id. at 1018.
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scheme of things." '146 The court also gave "great weight" to the fact that
Peterson considered his beliefs to be religious and regarded Creativity as
his religion. 47 Noting that Peterson had been a minister in the Church for
three years, the court also found that Creativity played a central role in
Peterson's life. 148 The court concluded that Peterson's beliefs in Creativity
occupy "a place in his life parallel to that held by a belief in God for
believers in more mainstream theistic religions.' ' 49 Thus, the court held
that Creativity "functions as" religion for Peterson, and that he had "met his
initial burden of showing that his beliefs constitute a 'religion' for purposes
of Title VII."'50
While the EEOC definition is broad, it is not all-encompassing.
Beliefs solely grounded on political, economic, or social ideology are not
protected. For example, membership in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is not a
protected religious belief under Title VII according to the EEOC and some
lower courts.15' Title VII, moreover, specifically excludes membership in a
Communist party organization from protection.'
Purely personal preferences, therefore, are not protected under the
EEOC definitions of religion or religious beliefs. The most famous
personal preference case, Brown v. Pena,'53 illuminates the difference
between purely personal preferences and protected religious beliefs. The
plaintiff in Brown alleged that he had been discriminated against because of
his religion. 5 4 The charges were based on Brown's "'personal religious
creed' that 'Kozy Kitten People/Cat Food... [was] contributing
significantly to [his] state of well being ... [and therefore] to [his] overall
work performance' by increasing his energy."'55  The district court
146. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir.
1978)).
147. Id. at 1022 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding
that the KKK is a political and social organization, and is therefore not a religion under Title
VII); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1973) (mem.)
("[T]he proclaimed racist and anti-semitic [sic] ideology of the [KKK] ... takes on, as
advanced by that organization, a narrow, temporal and political character inconsistent with
the meaning of "religion" as used in [Title VII]."), affd 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974);
EEOC Dec. No. 79-6, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1758, 1758-60 (Oct. 18, 1978)
(discussing the history and purpose of the KKK and finding that the organization considered
itself to be fraternal and political in nature, and therefore is not a religion). But cf Peterson,
205 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 ("[T]he courts in Bellamy and Slater provide little discussion as to
how they reach their conclusions.").
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f) (2000).
153. 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
154. Id. at 1383.
155. Id. at 1384 (final three alterations in original).
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discussed several definitions of religion and noted that each excludes
"unique personal moral preferences. '156  The Brown court held that
"[p]laintiff' s 'personal religious creed' concerning Kozy Kitten Cat Food
can only be described as such a mere personal preference and, therefore, is
beyond the parameters of the concept of religion as protected by ... [Title
VIII .157
Perhaps because the outcome of this case was clear from a common
sense perspective, the Brown court provided only conclusory analysis on
why Brown's "personal religious creed" concerning Kozy Kitten Cat Food
was a mere personal preference. 5 ' However, using the broadest legal
definition of religion, i.e., the Seeger/Welsh/EEOC guidelines, the outcome
is not at first glance unequivocal. Brown's belief seems to meet several of
the necessary criteria. First, (at least there is no evidence to the contrary in
the opinion) his belief in Kozy Kitten Cat Food was sincerely held.'59
Second, Brown classified his belief as "religious," which furthers his claim
in two respects: (1) the belief is "religious" in "his own scheme of
things,"' 6° and (2) his claim that his belief is religious "must be given great
weight."' 6' Third, while a belief in Kozy Kitten Cat Food might seem
irrational, a court is not free to judge the validity of beliefs it deems
"incomprehensible."' 162 Finally, it is of no importance that Brown's beliefs
are not related to a Supreme Being'63 or that no organized group shares
Brown's beliefs.164
Nevertheless, the district court's holding was sound. The crux of the
matter is that to be regarded as a religion, the belief must at least be moral
or ethical in nature. 165 A "religion" under Title VII encompasses "belief
systems which espouse notions of morality and ethics and supply a means
156. Id. at 1385.
157. Id.
158. Cf Knechtle, supra note 4, at 527 ("Despite plaintiffs testimony to the contrary,
the [Brown] court, citing Yoder and Seeger, tersely concluded that plaintiffs personal
religious creed was a mere personal preference .... ").
159. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) ("[The court's] task is to
decide whether the beliefs professed... are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious.").
160. Id.
161. Id. at 184.
162. Id. at 185; see also Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981) ("It
is inappropriate for a reviewing court to attempt to assess the truth or falsity of an
announced article of faith.").
163. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("[N]either a State nor the
Federal Government can... aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.").
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2004).
165. See id. (defining religious practices and observances as "moral or ethical beliefs as
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views.").
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from distinguishing right from wrong.' 66  While Kozy Kitten Cat Food
may contribute to Brown's well-being, work performance, and energy
level, 67 it does not provide him with principles for how to live his life. In
sum, Brown's belief in Kozy Kitten Cat Food is not a religious belief
because it is not based on moral or ethical beliefs, and not because it is
irrational, noninstitutional, and nontheistic.
IV. FRIEDMAN V. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP
Against the foregoing backdrop of the definition of religion in varying
contexts, a California appellate court was faced with the delicate question
of defining religion for purposes of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) 168 in 2002. At issue was whether an employee was
discriminated against on the basis of religion when he lost a job offer
because his deeply held vegan beliefs prohibited him from being inoculated
with a mumps vaccine. His story, the appellate court decision, and a
critique follow.
A. Background and Factual History
In March 1998, Jerold Friedman had been working as a temporary
worker for Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser)
69 for almost one year. 70
Friedman was a computer technician, and the location of his work premises
was a non-public, non-health care facility warehouse. 7' As such, Friedman
had absolutely no contact with any of Kaiser's patients. 72 At this time,
Kaiser decided it wanted to hire Friedman permanently for the same
computer technician position. 73 He would be working in the same location
166. Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023 (E.D. Wis.
2002).
167. Many things might contribute to well-being, energy, and work performance that no
one would seriously consider "religious." Examples include eating a nutritious diet, getting
adequate sleep, and exercising. Contra Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda:
Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 41
ARIZ. L. REv. 49, 87 (1999) ("Bike magazine ran an issue on bicycling obsession as a
'religion,' with a cover depicting the Madonna encircled by a bicycle gear."). Some
activities that may contribute to well-being, energy, and work performance, however, are
clearly religious, such as prayer. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-35 (1962)
(discussing the history of prayer as a religious activity in the United States).
168. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2004).
169. Kaiser was one of the named defendants in the case. Friedman v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Group, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
170. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Friedman (No. B 150017) (hereinafter "Friedman's
Brief").
171. Id. at 1-2.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
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and would continue to have no patient contact. 74 Kaiser gave Friedman an
offer of employment with a salary of about $48,800 per year. 75 On March
28, 1998, Kaiser informed Friedman that as a requirement for employment,
he would have to be immunized for mumps.'76
At the time Friedman filed his complaint, he had been a strict Ethical
Vegan for nine years. 77 An Ethical Vegan "believes that all living beings
must be valued equally and that it is immoral and unethical for humans to
kill and exploit animals, even for food, clothing and the testing of product
safety for humans.' 78 As an Ethical Vegan, Friedman could not and did
not "eat any animal based substances, such as meat, milk products, eggs,
honey, or any other food which contains ingredients derived from or tested
on animals.' ' 179 Furthermore, Friedman could not "use products which have
been tested for human safety on animals or which derive any of their
ingredients from animals such as cleaners, soap or toothpaste."'
180
Friedman described his beliefs as being "spiritual in nature."' 8' He strongly
adhered to his beliefs, and had even been arrested for civil disobedience at
animal rights demonstrations.
8 2
When Friedman discovered that Kaiser would require a mumps
vaccination, he called the Center for Disease Control and learned that the
mumps vaccine was grown in chicken embryos.8 3  According to
Friedman's "Ethical Vegan belief system, egg-laying hens suffer greatly in
chicken factory farms, and the use of unborn chickens to culture the mumps
vaccine causes further unnecessary deaths of chickens.'' 84  Being
inoculated with the mumps vaccine was therefore in violation of
Friedman's Ethical Vegan beliefs.8 5 Friedman told his would-be employer
that he could not take the vaccine because doing so would violate his
Ethical Vegan beliefs. 86 However, Friedman advised Kaiser that he was
''willing to comply with the spirit of the immunization requirement by
some means other than subjecting himself to inoculation ... including
being check [sic] periodically for mumps symptoms, following any other
regimen not involving the suffering or death of an animal, and even
174. Id.
175. Id. at 6.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 5.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 5-6.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2-3.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Id.
VEGANISM IN THE WORKPLACE
agreeing to work off-site." 187  While Friedman's direct supervisor was
amenable to an accommodation, upper management and the human
resources department were not. 8  On April 10, 1998, Friedman was told
not to come back to work.
8 9
B. Brief Procedural History
Friedman filed a charge of religious discrimination with the EEOC on
January 25, 1999.9 The charge alleged that his "termination discriminated
against him on the basis of his religious views in violation of Title VI."''
The EEOC issued a dismissal and right-to-sue notice to Friedman on June
2, 1999.192 Thus, Friedman was free to bring an action against Kaiser in
federal court under Title VII within ninety days. 1
93
Friedman chose not to file a complaint under Title VII in federal
court.'94 Instead, Friedman filed a complaint in the Los Angeles Superior
Court for religious creed discrimination under California's FEHA. In his
complaint, Friedman alleged he is a strict vegan and that:
As a strict Vegan, [plaintiff] fervently believes that all living
beings must be valued equally and that it is immoral and
unethical for humans to kill and exploit animals, even for food,
clothing and the testing of product safety for humans, and that
such use is a violation of natural law and the personal religious
tenets on which [plaintiff] bases his foundational creeds. He lives
each aspect of his life in accordance with this system of spiritual
beliefs. As a Vegan, and his beliefs [sic], [plaintiff] cannot eat
meat, dairy, eggs, honey or any other food which contains
ingredients derived from animals. Additionally, [plaintiff] cannot
wear leather, silk or any other material which comes from
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 6-7.
190. A copy of the EEOC charge is available at http://www.myerlawfirm.com/pdf-
files/VeganCharge.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
191. Id. at 3.
192. A copy of the notice is available at http://www.myerlawfirm.com/pdf-
filesfVeganEeocRtToSueLtr.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
193. Once the EEOC dismisses a charge, or issues a right-to-sue notice, the employee
has ninety days to bring suit in a federal district court. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (2002). Each
United States district court has jurisdiction over actions brought under Title VII. Id.
194. Friedman's reason for not pursuing his claim under Title VII is unknown to the
author. To speculate, perhaps the ninety day time period to file a claim under Title VII had
expired before he could file a complaint, or perhaps damages under state law were more
attractive. Unfortunately, as discussed infra Part V.C. and note 285, Friedman may have
been more successful under federal law.
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animals, and cannot use any products such as household
cleansers, soap or toothpaste which have been tested for human
safety on animals or derive any of their ingredients from animals.
This belief system[] guides the way that he lives his life.
[Plaintiff's] beliefs are spiritual in nature and set a course for his
entire way of life; he would disregard elementary self-interest in
preference to transgressing these tenets. [Plaintiff] holds these
beliefs with the strength of traditional religious views, and has
lived in accordance with his beliefs for over nine (9) years. As an
example of the religious conviction that [plaintiff] holds in his
Vegan beliefs, [plaintiff] has even been arrested for civil
disobedience actions at animal rights demonstrations. This
Vegan belief system guides the way that [plaintiff] lives his life.
These are sincere and meaningful beliefs which occupy a place in
[plaintiff's] life parallel to that filled by God in traditionally
religious individuals adhering to the Christian, Jewish or Muslim
Faiths.1 95
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers without leave to amend
to Friedman's causes of action for religious creed discrimination in
violation of the FEHA. 196 The trial court held that veganism "was not a
religious creed within the meaning of the FEHA."' 97  Friedman then
appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.
C. Friedman's Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Friedman argued that "'Ethical Veganism' is the functional
equivalent of a religion and/or religious belief under the California
[FEHA]."' 98 He argued that even if Ethical Veganism was not found to be
per se protected by the FEHA, his beliefs should still be viewed
subjectively, in accordance with the facts in the complaint. 99 Friedman
argued that non-institutional religions are covered under the FEHA.200 He
proposed that the definition of religion in the employment discrimination
context should be broader than the definition of religion in the
constitutional setting "in order to serve the differing public policy purpose
of eliminating discrimination in the workplace." 201  Friedman's main
195. Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 665-66 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (alterations in original).
196. Id. at 665.
197. Id.
198. Friedman's Brief at 15.
199. Id. at 18-19.
200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 21.
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arguments for treating Ethical Veganism as a moral and ethical equivalent
of a religion are encapsulated in his distinguishing of Brown v. Pena:
20 2
Ethical Veganism extends beyond trivial dietary preferences [i.e.
Brown's belief in Kozy Kitten Cat Food]. Diet is merely a small
part of observing a non-exploitive relationship with the people
and animals of this world. Ethical Veganism is a relational
"lense" [sic] through which to view the world. Ethical Vegans
are not "speciesist" and value the sanctity of all life, seeking to
exclude from their life, as far as possible and practical, all forms
of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or
any other purpose.... [B]eing vegetarian is only one small part
of being an Ethical Vegan.... A recent poll estimates there are a
half million Vegans in the continental United States. There is a
common ethical principle shared by all Vegans which is a
reverence for life and desire to live with, as opposed to depend
upon, the others [sic] species of the planet. Veganism is therefore
not some bizarre trivial personal belief, but is a sincerely held set
of moral and ethical values that rise to the level [sic] religious
beliefs, and should be afforded religious protections as such.2 °3
To further his argument that Ethical Veganism beliefs should be
treated as religious, Friedman cited an EEOC determination. In the
determination, the EEOC found that the plaintiff, a "strict vegetarian due to
moral and ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong," was protected by
Title VII.20 5 The EEOC determined that the plaintiff held his vegetarian
beliefs with the "strength of traditional religious views.' 20 6
Notably, Friedman did not propose a test for the court to use in
defining religion under the FEHA. He simply cited the definition of
religion promulgated by a regulation to the FEHA, 207 and argued that he
met the standard.
D. Kaiser's Arguments on Appeal
Kaiser argued on appeal that the trial court had correctly ruled that
202. 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
203. Friedman's Brief at 22-23.
204. Id. at 26. This EEOC determination is discussed infra Part V.C.
205. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
206. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
207. See id. at 24-25 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.1 (2002)). Under § 7293.1,
religious creed "includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs,
observances, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her
life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions."
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Friedman's vegan beliefs were not protected under the FEHA.2°s Kaiser
noted that there was "no published California case setting forth a test for
courts to follow in determining whether certain beliefs qualify as a
'religion' under the [FEHA].,, 209 As such, Kaiser argued the court should
use the test developed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Meyers.2'0 The Meyers court set forth a number of factors2" to
determine whether a set of beliefs is religious in nature. Kaiser argued that
Friedman's belief in veganism (which, according to Kaiser, is "confined to
one basic issue or moral teaching - namely, avoiding cruelty to any living
animal creature" 212) did not satisfy enough of the criteria to be considered a
religion under Meyers, and that it was instead a "personal, political,
ideological or social belief.,
213
Furthermore, Kaiser argued, Friedman's belief was comparable to the
beliefs at issue in Brown v. Pena, the KKK cases, and Meyers itself:
If Plaintiff's beliefs are entitled to protection as a "religion," then
so are the beliefs of the KKK, worshipers of the Church of
Marijuana, prisoners who believe in the spiritual powers of cat
food, and anyone else with any passionately held belief. All they
would need to do to claim protection is tell their employer that
their belief is "sincere," and it "holds a place parallel to that of
traditionally recognized religions" in their life. It simply cannot
be the law that California employers must accommodate any such
claim. There must be a more objective standard for employers
and courts to follow.
214
Finally, Kaiser argued that the EEOC Determination cited by Friedman,
being non-adjudicative in nature, was without legal effect and was not
persuasive authority for any court.215
E. The Appellate Court Decision
The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Presiding Justice
Turner, devoted nearly twenty-one pages to answering "the question of
whether veganism is a 'religious creed' within the meaning of the
208. See Respondent's Brief at 12, Friedman (No. B 150017) (hereinafter Kaiser's Brief).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 12-19.
211. Meyers is discussed supra Part III.B.2.
212. Kaiser's Brief at 17.
213. Id. at 18.
214. Id. at 20-21.
215. Id. at21.
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California Fair Employment and Housing Act. 216  The scope of
California's FEHA is quite similar to Title VII. The EEOC's California
equivalent, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC),
enacted regulation 7293.1, which states that "'[r]eligious creed' includes
any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observances, or
practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or
her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized
religions. 217 The court noted that this definition originated from Seeger
and Welsh.218 While the EEOC regulation defining religion also originated
from Seeger and Welsh, the court later explained what it perceived to be
differences between the EEOC and FEHC definitions of religion.219
The court began its analysis by examining California decisional
authority. The court noted, as had Kaiser, that there was no California case
construing the definition of religious creed under the FEHA, and proceeded
to look at the question of what is a religion in other contexts.220 After
looking to several California decisions, the court came to a few
conclusions. The court found that while "[a] belief in a Supreme Being is
not required.... something more than a philosophy or way of life is
required., 221  The court noted further that "[a]mong the factors to be
considered are whether the belief system occupies in a person's life a place
parallel to that of God in recognized religions and whether it addresses
ultimate concerns thereby filling a void in the individual's life.
' 222
The court next examined United States Supreme Court cases,
discussing Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder at length. 223 The court's discussion of
Seeger and Welsh is substantially the same as the discussion of these cases
earlier in this comment.224 With respect to Yoder, however, the court gave
more weight to the plurality's conception of religion than is given in this
comment.225 Important for the court was that "the Yoder plurality
distinguished those beliefs which are entitled to constitutional Free
Exercise Clause protection from viewpoints 'based on purely secular
considerations' or a 'subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values .... ,,226
216. Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 665 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
217. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.1 (2002).
218. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667.
219. Id. at 682-84.
220. Id. at 667-70.
221. Id. at 669.
222. Id. at 670.
223. Id. at 670-74.
224. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.b-c.
225. See supra note 93.
226. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16 (1972)).
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The court subsequently looked to Title VII and the EEOC's definition
of religion.227 Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, In228 was examined
as an example of how Title VII has been applied to a nontraditional
religious organization (i.e. the World Church of the Creator and its
teachings of Creativity).
229
The court devoted an extensive discussion to Judge Adams's
concurring opinion in Malnak v. Yogi. The court noted, "[w]e have found
no court which has explicitly or implicitly rejected Judge Adams's views
expressed.., in Malnak. Commentators have recognized Judge Adams's
opinion as the most influential judicial opinion in the past several decades
in terms of defining religion., 230  The court also looked to other circuit
court opinions that had adopted Judge Adams's test including, inter alia,
Africa and Meyers. The court concluded "[i]n contexts other than
employment, in the last 23 years, the federal courts have articulated a less
expansive definition of religion or religious creed than that in title 29 Code
of Federal Regulations section 1605.1 as administratively construed. 231
Before applying the law to Friedman's beliefs, the court briefly
discussed the one case it had found dealing with veganism and religion,
Spies v. Voinovich.232  In Spies, "the court of appeals considered an
inmate's claim that as a Zen Buddhist he was required to maintain a vegan
diet. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that Zen Buddhism did not
require a vegan diet and the vegetarian diet provided sufficed.,
233
Importantly, however, the Spies court observed, "in pointing out that
veganism is not required of Zen Buddhists, we are not stating that Spies's
227. Id. at 674-75.
228. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2002). Peterson is discussed supra note 23 and
Part III.D.
229. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676-77.
230. Id. at 679. For this proposition, the court cited, inter alia, Feofanov, supra note 27,
at 375-77. While not noted by the court, it should be remembered that the Adams test has
not escaped its fair share of criticism. In discussing the Adams test Feofanov himself notes
that:
Commentators, however, identified a number of problems with the Adams test.
First, it excluded less conventional beliefs. Indeed, some anarchic traditions of
Christianity eschewed ceremony and hierarchy and thus would not have
qualified. Another problem inherent in the Adams test is that it did not provide
any guidance for instances when some, but not all, criteria were present. Third,
it required a fairly intrusive inquiry by the courts into allegedly religious
beliefs-something that appears to be prohibited by the entanglement prong of
Lemon v. Kurtzman. Overall, the Adams test was inventive, but not quite
successful.
Id. at 375 (footnotes omitted).
231. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
232. 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999).
233. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
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veganism is not a sincerely-held religious belief.,
234
After this extensive treatment of the law addressing the definition of
religion in varying contexts and jurisdictions, the court decided to apply
Judge Adams's test from his concurring opinion in Malnak.135 According
to the court, it decided to apply Judge Adams's test because it "presents the
best objective method for answering the question whether a belief plays the
role of a religion and functions as such in an individual's life. 236 The court
also found that the test was consistent with regulation 7293.1, as the
regulation "adopts by its terms a less expansive definition of religion than
that promulgated by the EEOC. 237 Important in the court's decision to use
Judge Adams's test was its finding that "[tihere is a significant difference
between the EEOC's administrative construction of the term 'religion' and
the definition of 'religious creed' in regulation 7293. 1.,,238 The difference
between the two definitions is explained by the court as follows:
The EEOC definition includes "moral or ethical beliefs as to what
is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views." Regulation 7293.1, on the other
hand, defines "religious creed" as "beliefs, observances, or
practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy
in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of
traditionally recognized religions." Under regulation 7293.1,
purely moral or ethical beliefs that are held with the strength of
religious convictions may not qualify for protection under the
FEHA.... The "importance parallel to that of traditionally
recognized religions" requirement is not contained in title 29
Code of Federal Regulations section 1605.1.239
Furthermore, according to the court, the EEOC definition expands
religion even further than the Seeger/Welsh test.240 Seeger and Welsh held
that the belief must "occupy a place in the life of its possessor 'parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption.' 241 But according to the court:
234. 173 F.3d at 407.
235. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682. Curiously, neither Friedman nor Kaiser briefed
the issue of whether Friedman's vegan beliefs were "religious" under the Adams test. See
discussion of Friedman's and Kaiser's briefs on appeal, supra Part IV.C-D.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 682-83.
238. Id. at 683.
239. Id. at 683 (citations omitted).
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)) (alteration in
original).
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The EEOC regulation, as administratively construed, appears to
dispense with the requirement that religion is predicated on
something more comprehensive than a personal moral or ethical
code, however strongly held. It extends, by its terms, to "moral or
ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely
held with the strength of traditional religious views." Under the
EEOC definition, as construed administratively, a strongly held
moral or ethical view may qualify as a religious belief, even
though the view is essentially political, sociological, or economic
and is in "no way related to a Supreme Being." Seeger and
Welsh are more restrictive than the EEOC's administrative
242construction ....
Finally, the court applied Judge Adams's three indicia to Friedman's
beliefs. Applying the first indicium-that "a religion addresses
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and
imponderable matters'" 243-the court found:
There is no allegation or judicially noticeable evidence plaintiff's
belief system addresses fundamental or ultimate questions. There
is no claim that veganism speaks to: the meaning of human
existence; the purpose of life; theories of humankind's nature or
its place in the universe; matters of human life and death; or the
exercise of faith. There is no apparent spiritual or otherworldly
component to plaintiff's beliefs. Rather, plaintiff alleges a moral
and ethical creed limited to the single subject of highly valuing
animal life and ordering one's life based on that perspective.
While veganism compels plaintiff to live in accord with strict
dictates of behavior, it reflects a moral and secular, rather than
religious, philosophy. 4
The second indicium is comprehensiveness: "a religion is
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an
isolated teaching." 245 As for this indicium, the court found that:
[W]hile plaintiff's belief system governs his behavior in wide-
242. Id. at 684 (citations omitted). This Comment argues that the EEOC definition of
religion does not, contrary to what the Friedman court states, extend the Seeger/Welsh
definition of religion. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
243. Id. at 685 (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981)).
244. Id.
245. Id. (quoting Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032).
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ranging respects, including the food he eats, the clothes he wears,
and the products he uses, it is not sufficiently comprehensive in
nature to fall within the provisions of regulation 7293.1. Plaintiff
does not assert that his belief system derives from a power or
being or faith to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else depends.246
The third indicium is the presence of formal or external signs. 247
While the court noted that this indicium is not determinative, it found that
"no formal or external signs of a religion are present., 248 In particular, the
court found no "teachers or leaders; services or ceremonies; structure or
organization; orders of worship or articles of faith; or holidays."249
After concluding that Friedman's beliefs were not in accordance with
any of the three indicia, the court held:
Absent a broader, more comprehensive scope, extending to
ultimate questions, it cannot be said that plaintiff s veganism falls
within the scope of regulation 7293.1. Rather, plaintiff's
veganism is a personal philosophy, albeit shared by many others,
and a way of life.... Therefore, plaintiffs veganism is not a
religious creed within the meaning of the FEHA.25°
While the court held that Friedman's beliefs did not qualify for
protection under the FEHA, it did not shut the door to protection from
discrimination for all religiously-inspired vegans. This is because the court
did not "resolve the question of whether a vegan lifestyle that results from a
religious belief otherwise meeting the standard in regulation 7293.1 is
subject to FEHA coverage. 22 '
F. Criticism of the Court's Decision
Several aspects of the Friedman court's opinion merit consideration.
First, the EEOC regulation defining religion does not, contrary to what is
stated by the court, extend the Seeger/Welsh definition of religion. The
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 685-86.
250. ld. at 686.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 683-84 ("The federal regulation, in our view, goes further than did the
United States Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh.... Seeger and Welsh are more
restrictive than the EEOC's administrative construction of title 29 Code of Federal
Regulations part 1605.1.").
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court argued that because the EEOC regulation does not require that in
order to qualify as religious, a belief must occupy a place in the life of its
possessor "'parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God' '253 of one
who is clearly religious, it has somehow extended the Seeger/Welsh
standard. But is not the EEOC's phrasing, i.e., that the belief must be held
"with the strength of traditional religious views, 254 really just another way
of making the exact analogy the Court used in Seeger and Welsh?
Furthermore, the regulation specifically states that the EEOC standard was
developed in Seeger and Welsh. 5 An explicit reading of the regulation
reveals that it does not extend and does not intend to extend the
Seeger/Welsh standard.256
There is another fault with the court's argument that the EEOC
regulation extends the Seeger/Welsh standard. The court argues that Seeger
and Welsh are more restrictive than the EEOC regulation because "[u]nder
the EEOC definition, as construed administratively, a strongly held moral
or ethical view may qualify as a religious belief, even though the view is
essentially political, sociological, or economic and is in 'no way related to
a Supreme Being.' 257 But the Supreme Court has declared that "if the
claimed religious beliefs... meet the test that we lay down then [the
plaintiffs'] objections cannot be based on a 'merely personal' moral
code., 258 A strongly held moral or ethical belief, therefore, cannot be
essentially political, sociological, or economic as long as it meets the test.
Thus, the court's argument that the EEOC definition expands the
Seeger/Welsh standard is unsound.
Along these lines, the court is also splitting hairs by arguing that the
FEHA definition of religion is less expansive than the EEOC regulation.
Both definitions, by their statutory language, are based on the Seeger/Welsh
standard. Therefore, the same arguments for the position that the EEOC
definition is not broader than the SeegerlWelsh standard apply to the
argument that the FEHA definition is not less expansive than the EEOC
definition.
The second criticism of the court's opinion is that the court focuses
too much on "veganism" as a religion and not enough on Friedman's
personal beliefs. The court is correct that the test to define religion is
essentially objective, but an individual's beliefs must be examined
subjectively. In the words of Justice Clark, writing for the majority in
253. Id. at 683 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166).
254. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2004).
255. Id.
256. Whether or not court opinions can be interpreted to have broadened the EEOC
definition is another question, one which is beyond the scope of this comment.
257. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186).
258. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
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Seeger' "in resolving these... problems one deals with the beliefs of
different individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In
such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the [individual] that
his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great
weight."259  In his complaint, Friedman classified his beliefs as his
"personal religious tenets. 260  Furthermore, he asserted that "[hie lives
each aspect of his life in accordance with this system of spiritual beliefs. 26'
Friedman claimed that his belief was an essential part of a religious faith,
but the court did not give his claim "great weight" or, for that matter, any
weight. The court should have given more probative value to the fact that
Friedman classified his beliefs as religious.
The final criticism of the court's opinion is that even using Judge
Adams's test, (which will be criticized below) Friedman's beliefs can
satisfy the three elements. The first indicium is the nature of the ideas in
question. When listing examples of "ultimate" ideas, the court does not
give the following example given by Judge Adams himself: "the proper
,,262moral code of right and wrong. Ultimate concerns "are those likely to
be the most 'intensely personal' and important to the believer.
263
Friedman lives his life according to the moral code that all living beings-
humans and animals alike-must be valued equally.264 This is his "ultimate
concern," and it guides the way he lives his life. The food he eats, the
clothing he wears, and the products he buys are all a consequence of his
moral and ethical beliefs in the equality of all living beings.2 65  For
Friedman, the way he lives his life is "right," while killing and exploiting
animals is "wrong." His belief system gives him "the proper moral code of
right and wrong," and therefore, his beliefs address fundamental questions.
Furthermore, as asserted in his complaint, Friedman's beliefs can be
viewed as comprehensive. Friedman "lives each aspect of his life in
accordance with this system of spiritual beliefs. 266 He cannot eat a meal,
get dressed in the morning, or go shopping without his beliefs affecting his
decisions. No court would question the comprehensiveness of a Christian's
beliefs, even a Christian whose religious activities consist of going to
church twice a year for Christmas and Easter. This is the case for the sole
reason that a "Christian" is connected with a recognized religious
institution. Non-institutionalized religious beliefs should not be penalized
for their lack of establishment. Friedman's belief system is surely more
259. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
260. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
261. Id.
262. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
263. Id. (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184).
264. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665-66.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 665.
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comprehensive than that of many individuals who are nominally associated
with a religious institution.
In applying any of the three indicia, it must be remembered that Judge
Adams developed his standards as a way for courts to have objective
criteria to apply the Seeger/Welsh standard. His standard cannot be applied
in a way that would overrule the Court's holdings in Seeger and Welsh, i.e.,
that the beliefs of Seeger and Welsh were religious. Seeger and Welsh
believed strongly that killing humans in war was morally wrong, and their
consciences forbade them from doing so. 267 Similarly, Friedman believed
that killing any living being, for any reason whatsoever, was morally and
ethically wrong.26 s As compared to the beliefs of Seeger and Welsh,
Friedman's beliefs are surely at least as "comprehensive."
The third indicium is the presence of formal signs. Friedman's belief
system encompasses two formal elements found in many traditional
religions: restrictions on diet and dress. Furthermore, the complaint asserts
that Friedman had been arrested for civil disobedience at animal rights
demonstrations.2 69 This can be viewed as a form of proselytizing, or an
attempt at propagation, which courts have recognized as a formal sign of a
religion.270 In any event, the lack of formal signs cannot and should not be
used to deny a set of beliefs religious protection. This argument will be
discussed further in Part V.
In summary, the Friedman court applied Judge Adams's test because
of its erroneous beliefs that the EEOC definition of religion expanded the
Seeger/Welsh definition and that the California FEHC definition was more
restrictive than the EEOC definition. While Judge Adams's test is
inappropriate in the employment context, as will be discussed in Part V, the
facts of Friedman's case demonstrate that his vegan beliefs can meet each
of the three indicia.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Judge Adams's Test Is Not Appropriate in the Employment
Discrimination Setting
Judge Adams's test should not be used by courts that are faced with
the difficult task of defining religion vis-h-vis an employment
discrimination statute. The main reason the test is inappropriate in the
267. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970).
268. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
269. Id. at 666.
270. See United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (listing
"propagation" as one of the external signs that "may indicate that a particular set of beliefs
is 'religious"').
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employment discrimination setting is that it forces courts to make an
inappropriate analogy. None of the various definitions for religion
examined purport to distinguish between externally and internally derived
beliefs. Internally derived beliefs, however, are not typically associated
with an established organization. There are very few similarities between a
person's unique system of beliefs and traditional religions, such as
Christianity or Judaism, which have hundreds of years of history and
memberships in the millions. What can be compared, however, are the
strength of the beliefs and the place the beliefs occupy in the life of their
possessor. And that is exactly what the Seeger/WelshlEEOC definitions
do. The Seeger test is "whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption. '27' What is important is the belief, not the infrastructure or the
institution. Therefore, the indicium of "formal signs" seems to be a
completely irrelevant and misleading inquiry.
Another reason the test should be abandoned in this context is because
it was developed in a Free Exercise Clause case. There are problems that
arise when defining religion for First Amendment purposes that do not
plague employment discrimination cases. One of the major problems is
that if religion is defined too broadly, it could lead to Establishment Clause
problems.272 For example, if veganism was deemed a religious belief in a
First Amendment context and a school taught a course in veganism, there
may be an Establishment Clause violation. Also, defining religion too
broadly for First Amendment purposes could lead to more groups claiming
free exercise rights in attempts to circumvent neutral state laws and
policies.273
For employment discrimination purposes, however, beliefs are
271. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
272. The phrasing of the Religion Clauses... creates a definitional dilemma: If the
Free Exercise Clause is intended to protect religious adherents from government
action that impinges on their faith, then the term "religion" must be defined very
broadly, to encompass all behavior that is motivated by religion. But if the
same broad definition is used to limit government action under the
Establishment Clause, then many activities of the modern regulatory state would
suddenly be vulnerable to constitutional challenge as establishments of religion.
GEY, supra note 36, at 97.
273. This was a fear of the district court in United States v. Meyers:
Were the Court to recognize Meyers' beliefs as religious, it might soon find
itself on a slippery slope where anyone who was cured of an ailment by a
"medicine" that had pleasant side-effects could claim that they had founded a
constitutionally or statutorily protected religion based on the beneficial
"medicine."
906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508 (D. Wyo. 1995).
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examined individually. If the Friedman court had held that Friedman's
beliefs were protected by the FEHA, it would not have also been holding
that "veganism" is a religion. Not every vegan would have a valid claim of
employment discrimination if faced with a mandatory vaccination. First,
the employee would have to tell the employer that a job requirement was in
contravention of his or her religious beliefs. Second, the employee would
have to prove that he or she considers the vegan beliefs to be religious and
that the beliefs are held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.
Third, even if the beliefs are found to be religious, a claim will fail if the
employer can show that it could not accommodate the employee without
undue hardship.
The final reason the Adams test should not be used for employment
discrimination purposes is the foundational inconsistency of the test itself.
The Adams test was developed as a way for courts to apply the
Seeger/Welsh "analogy. 274 However, under the Adams test, it is likely that
the belief systems of Seeger and Welsh would not be found to be
"religious" at all.275 Any test that would exclude the belief systems of
Seeger and Welsh from classification as religious, while claiming to be
based upon the Seeger/Welsh standard, is inherently inconsistent. In
fairness, this inconsistency may not be directly attributable to Judge Adams
himself, who warned that the indicia "should not be thought of as a final
'test"' and that "[f]lexibility and careful consideration of each belief system
are needed. 276 Nonetheless, the standards have been applied as a test with
superfluous rigidity. In short, the Adams test is too restrictive to be used
for employment discrimination purposes.
B. A Move Back to Seeger/Welsh and the EEOC Definition
Federal and state courts should adhere to the EEOC definition of
religion when challenged with defining religion for the purposes of Title
VII or state FEP laws. The EEOC is the government agency charged with
administering Title VII, and as such, its interpretation is entitled to
deference by the courts.277 Notwithstanding the deference issue, the EEOC
has stated the best definition of religion for employment discrimination
cases because its definition is broad and is based on Supreme Court
274. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
275. Seeger's beliefs are discussed supra at Part III.A.2.b, and Welsh's beliefs are
discussed supra Part IlI.A.2.c.
276. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210 (Adams, J., concurring).
277. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (discussing the weight to be given to an administrative agency's interpretation of
federal law); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) ("[Tlhe
regulations promulgated by the governmental body responsible for interpreting or
administering a statute are entitled to considerable respect .... ").
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precedent.
"Religion" should be defined as broadly as possible for purposes of
employment discrimination laws. The problem of defining religion for
First Amendment purposes (i.e., broadly defining religion in Free Exercise
Clause cases may create Establishment Clause problems) does not exist in
the employment discrimination context. Additionally, defining religion
broadly for employment discrimination cases would not open the
floodgates to increased litigation. Even if more sets of beliefs are held to
be religious, employers will not necessarily be subjected to additional
liability. First, an employee or prospective employee cannot make out a
prima facie case of employment discrimination because of religion unless
the employer had knowledge of the religious belief.2 78  Therefore,
employers do not need to worry about unintentionally discriminating
against a person based on unusual beliefs unless the person has declared
those beliefs to be religious. Second, even if an employer knows a person
has religious beliefs, accommodation is only necessary if it does not cause
undue hardship on the employer's business.2 79 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the accommodation requirement very narrowly.
20
Another reason the EEOC definition of religion should be used is
because it is based upon the Supreme Court's definition of religion in
Seeger and Welsh. While subjected to their share of criticism, Seeger and
2811
Welsh are the current Supreme Court precedent for defining religion.
The EEOC's definition should be used by the courts because its definition
originates from the Supreme Court and is highly protective of workers'
rights. The intent of Congress in Title VII was to protect workers from
invidious or arbitrary discrimination. The statute protects persons who are
discriminated against "because of... religion.' 282  To fully realize
Congress's intent, "religion" as used in Title VII and in state employment
discrimination statutes should be interpreted broadly to include moral and
ethical beliefs that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
278. See supra note 24 (listing the elements of a prima facie case for religious
discrimination).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
280. See supra note 18 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of accommodation and
undue hardship in TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), which holds
that an employer does not need to incur more than minimal costs in order to accommodate
an employee's religious practices).
281. See, e.g., Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (utilizing the Seeger
standard to evaluate a free exercise claim); see generally Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note,
Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 330 (1984) (discussing criticisms of the Seeger/Welsh definition of
religion "[d]espite its generally acknowledged status as an expression of constitutional
law"). But see Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Whether Seeger meant to
define 'religion' as used in the First Amendment is doubtful.").
282. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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religious beliefs. The fact that an individual asserts that his beliefs are
religious "in his own scheme of things" should weigh heavily in favor of
protection.
C. Veganism as a Religion
Vegan beliefs should be protected as religious beliefs under Title VII
and state FEP laws when a person's choice to adhere to veganism stems
from deeply held moral and ethical beliefs and the person holds those
beliefs with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.283 There are many
indications in the case law and elsewhere that, under certain circumstances,
vegan beliefs can and should be found to be "religious" under Title VII. As
a matter of public policy, state FEP laws should provide at least as much
protection as Title VH does for employees.
While those with vegan beliefs that are sincerely held with the
strength of traditional religious beliefs should be protected under religious
discrimination statutes, this Comment does not assert that "veganism" or
"Ethical Veganism" is a religion. It is not the case that all vegans should
have a cause of action for religious discrimination. People choose not to
eat meat for many reasons. 284 A choice to abstain from eating or using
animal products based on personal preference, such as taste aversions or
health or medical considerations, could not be "religious" under even the
broadest definition of religion. It is only when a person's choice to adhere
to veganism stems from deeply held moral and ethical beliefs, and the
person holds those beliefs with the strength of traditional religious beliefs,
that veganism can rise to the level of a protected religious belief or
practice.
Many sources, including federal law, state law, and an EEOC
determination, lend support to a successful cause of action for religious
discrimination because of sincerely held vegan beliefs. If Friedman had
brought his case under federal law, he would have had a better chance of
not having his case dismissed.285 In Spies v. Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit
283. There are many different varieties of "veganism" and "vegetarianism." This
comment does not distinguish between them in terms of the protection these beliefs should
be afforded when they rise to the level of a protected religious belief. "Vegan" and
"veganism" are used most frequently, but other terms, including "Ethical veganism" and
"strict vegetarianism," can be substituted when appropriate.
284. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 657 (5th ed. 2000) ("Many vegetarians have religious bases for their
lifestyle, but many others are vegetarians for health reasons. Still others have what might be
called philosophical or moral reasons for not consuming animals.").
285. See Veganism a Religion? It Depends, [2002] 2 Lab. & Empl. Bull. (MB) 1, para.
15 (Nov. 1, 2002) ("Friedman lost his claim, not because it was considered frivolous, but
because serious consideration of the specific language of the California law was deemed not
to apply in his circumstance. Had Friedman brought his claim under Title VII, there
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stated that even though it found that veganism is not required of Zen
Buddhists, it was "not stating that Spies's veganism is not a sincerely-held
religious belief., 286 Rather, the prison did not have to provide Spies with a
vegan diet because its decision not to do so was "reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.
2 87
While the majority's opinion will prove useful to future vegan
plaintiffs, the Spies dissent is even more helpful by criticizing the majority
for placing too much emphasis on the fact that Spies's religion did not
require him to maintain a vegan diet. According to Judge Moore, "[c]ourts
are ill-equipped to act as arbiters of the tenets of religious faith" and should
not be determining "whether a particular practice is a 'required' aspect of a
religion. 288 A Zen Buddhist, like Friedman, can have a sincerely held
religious belief in maintaining a vegan lifestyle without an order from any
temple or organization. Purely internally-derived beliefs are protected
under anti-discrimination laws: "the First Amendment [like Title VII] does
not provide greater protection for centralized religions with established sets
of mandatory doctrines than it provides for less established or individual-
based religions. 289
The Friedman court itself also indicated that veganism may be a
sincerely held religious belief. The court consciously left open "the
question of whether a vegan lifestyle that results from a religious belief
otherwise meeting the standard ... is subject to FEHA coverage.,, 290 Here,
the court indicated that it is possible for a vegan lifestyle that results from a
protected religious belief to be covered under the state FEP statute. An
example of a vegan lifestyle that results from a protected religious belief
may be a situation where a person's veganism is derived from tenets of a
traditional religion, such as Buddhism.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission directly addressed
the question of whether vegan beliefs can rise to the level of protected
religious beliefs under Title VII, and it answered the question in the
affirmative. 9 While the Friedman court noted that it could only find one
case dealing with veganism and religion,292 it did not discuss the EEOC
determination Friedman cited in his brief. Although an EEOC
determination has no binding legal effect, it is prudent to examine all
possible sources when the law on a particular area is as sparse as the law on
probably would have been a different result.") (emphasis added).
286. 173 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 1999). Spies is discussed supra Part IV.E.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 409 (Moore, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
290. Friedman, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686.
291. Anderson v. Orange County Transit Auth., EEOC Charge No. 345960598 (Aug. 20,
1996).
292. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
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veganism and religion.
The compelling story behind the EEOC's determination in Anderson
v. Orange County Transit Authority received national attention from the
media.293 In 1996, Bruce Anderson was fired from his position as a bus
driver for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA). 294 As a
strict vegetarian, he refused to hand out promotional coupons for free
hamburgers at a fast food restaurant to bus passengers. 295 Anderson said
handing out the coupons "violated his beliefs [as a devout vegetarian] that
animals should not be killed or eaten. 296 The coupons were to be handed
out one day a week for a month, and Anderson offered to put the coupons
in a basket so passengers could help themselves.297 OCTA apparently was
not agreeable to this accommodation and fired Anderson for
insubordination. 29' Anderson filed a discrimination complaint with the
EEOC, and he also brought suit against OCTA in Orange County Superior
Court.
29 9 The EEOC determined that Anderson had "strongly held moral
and ethical beliefs" and that he held his beliefs "with the strength of
traditional religious views.,, 300 The Commission found that OCTA had
"failed to reasonably accommodate him, thus violating laws against
religious discrimination., 30 ' Anderson's lawsuit against OCTA ultimately
settled, with OCTA agreeing to pay Anderson $50,000 and also agreeing to
"amend its employee handbook to explicitly state that it will abide by
federal regulations governing religious and personal freedom in the
workplace."30 2 OCTA, of course, denied any admission of error, citing
avoiding the cost of a trial as its reason for settling.3 3
While not binding legal authority on any court, the EEOC
determination is important because it is the first concrete recognition that
strict vegetarian beliefs can rise to the level of protected beliefs under
religious discrimination statutes. When a set of beliefs, moral and ethical
in nature, is held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs, it is
deserving of protection. The Friedmans and Andersons of this country
293. See David Haldane, Vegetarian Bus Driver Settles Suit Against Agency for $50,000,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at A3. The story was also picked up internationally. See
Vegetarian Bus Driver Wins Some Lettuce, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France),
Nov. 25, 1996, at 3, available at 1996 WL 4094649.
294. Haldane, supra note 293, at A22.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Michael Granberry, Vegetarian Driver Plans to File Suit, L.A. TIMES, June 15,
1996, at B 1.
298. Haldane, supra note 293, at A22.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
302. Id. at A3.
303. Id. at A22.
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should be able to maintain their employment without being forced to
violate their sincere religious beliefs. °4
Another reason vegan beliefs can and should be protected under
religious discrimination statutes is to avoid arbitrary results. While a case
has yet to come before a court, it is almost certain that a person who has
deeply held vegan beliefs-and is associated with an organized religion-
will be protected from religious discrimination because of those beliefs.
While veganism is not technically "required" under many organized
religions, it is associated with many traditional religions.3 °5 If a person ties
vegan beliefs to one of those traditional religions, even though such beliefs
are not technically required by the religion, courts will very likely provide a
cause of action for discrimination because of those beliefs.0 6 All sincerely
held moral or ethical vegan beliefs should be protected because it is
arbitrary to say that a vegan who is affiliated with an organized religion
must be given protection while a vegan who holds the same beliefs-
though internally derived-does not deserve the law's protection:
Decisions like that rendered by the Friedman court are arbitrary because a
person who is a vegan for all the same reasons as Friedman, but who also
happens to be a member of an organized religion-whether or not that
304. In asserting that his vegan beliefs are religious in nature, Friedman is not unique.
Many people do claim veganism as their religion. For example, some people refer to
themselves as Spiritual Vegans. See Spiritual Vegans at http://www.geocities.com/spiritual
vegans/index2.html (last updated May 21, 2002) ("[T]he added spiritual dimension to
veganism fills a need for many vegans who have deeply [sic] spiritual feelings, especially in
regard to animals. Unless these vegans belong to one of the main religions, their feelings,
until now, have had no recognisable home. Spiritual Veganism may be the answer for
them."); cf. Stanley M. Sapon, Is Veganism a Religion?, VEGNEws (Dec. 2002), available
at http://www.veganvalues.org/veganism-religion.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005)
(describing the Friedman opinion as an "inflammatory and threatening set of findings" for
"Vegans of conscience.... whose deep feelings of respect and reverence for all life has
acquired the force of conviction, a core of principled moral philosophy that not only
characterizes, but shapes and informs their lives.").
305. Veganism is associated with many major recognized religions including, Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Wicca. See Vegan Ethics, at
http://www.veganforlife.org/ethics.htm (last updated Aug. 18, 2002) ("The ethics of
veganism tie in closely with the ethics of most of the world"s [sic] major religions, and the
practice of veganism is complementary to the teachings of many of the world"s [sic] great
prophets and religious teachers."); see generally International Vegetarian Union, Religion
and Vegetarianism at http://www.ivu.org/religion/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2004) (providing
links to articles and websites about religion and vegetarianism).
306. This proposition is based on analogy to other cases where courts have protected
religious beliefs or practices even though not "required" by the plaintiffs organized
religion. See, e.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
Title VII protects more than beliefs or practices specifically mandated or prohibited by an
employee's religion, because to restrict Title VII to protection of only required practices
would require the courts to determine what is or is not required by a certain religion, which
the Supreme Court has said should not be done).
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religion mandates veganism-would most likely be protected.
Furthermore, opinions like Friedman might actually encourage people to
join a religion that supports a vegan or vegetarian diet just to get workplace
protection.
307
VI. CONCLUSION
"[W]e have become a Nation of many religions and sects, representing
all the diversities of the human race."30 8 While religion in the United States
is ubiquitous, it is not self-defining. A broad and tolerant or, in the words
of Justice Douglas, "exalted"30 9 definition of religion must be used under
Title VII and state fair employment practice laws to protect American
workers from discrimination because of religion. To protect all workers
from religious discrimination, "religion" as used in employment
discrimination statutes should be interpreted broadly to include moral and
ethical beliefs that are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
religious beliefs.
Jerry Friedman's religion is veganism. He lost his job rather than
transgress his personal religious convictions. While a California appellate
court held that Friedman's beliefs are not protected religious beliefs under
the California FEHA, Friedman, and many others like him, still adhere to
their religion: veganism. Under a broad and tolerant definition of religion
for purposes of employment discrimination statutes, veganism-when
sincerely held as ethical and moral beliefs that are religious in the worker's
own scheme of things-should be a protected religious belief.
307. Cf. Amy Ogden & Paul Rebein, Do Prison Inmates Have a Right to Vegetarian
Meals?, VEGETARIAN JOURNAL (Mar./Apr. 2001), available at http://www.vrg.org/joumal/vj
2001mar/2001marprison.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2001).
Receiving vegetarian or vegan meals in prison is no easy process. Although it
may sound crass, the easiest way to receive vegetarian or vegan meals in prison
is to join a religion that has vegetarianism or veganism as a tenet of the faith.
Although it could be argued that ethical veganism should qualify as a religion
under the First Amendment, courts may rule otherwise.
Id. (emphasis added).
308. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
309. Id.
408
